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Abstract
This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing
for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ball
process. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods
and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods
and money. We compare the results with Kiyotaki and Wright (1993),
Trejos and Wright (1995), and Lagos and Wright (2005) respectively.
We nd that the multilateral matching setting generates very simple
and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those in the
other papers, but which have important di¤erences. In particular, sur-
plus maximization can be achieved in this setting, in equilibrium, with
a positive money supply. Moreover, with exible prices and directed
search, the rst best allocation can be attained through price posting
or through auctions with lotteries, but not through auctions without
lotteries. Finally, analysis of the case of divisible goods and money
can be performed without the assumption of large families (as in Shi
(1997)) or the day and night structure of Lagos and Wright (2005).
JEL Codes: C78, D44, E40.
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multilateral matching.
We thank Randall Wright, Merwan Engineer, and Miguel Molico for useful sugges-
tions.
yBenoît Julien: Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South
Wales and University of Sydney; John Kennes: Centre for Applied Microeconometrics,
University of Copenhagen; and Ian King: The University of Otago.
1
1 Introduction
Search theoretic models of monetary exchange have traditionally carried the
assumptions that matches occur randomly and bilaterally, and that prices
are determined by bilateral bargaining. These assumptions have proven to
be useful in the development of models with indivisible money and goods
(Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)), indivisible money and divisible goods (Shi
(1995), Trejos and Wright (1995)), and models with divisible money and
divisible goods (Shi (1997), Molico (2004), Lagos and Wright (2005)). How-
ever, to a certain extent, they run counter to the spirit of clean economic
theorizing that motivates the research program (Wallace (2001)). The as-
sumption of random matching removes the search process itself from the
realm of choice theory by making it purely a technological phenomenon
that agents face. Similarly, the assumption of bilateral bargaining imposes
a particular price determination mechanism that has no justication from
the theory of mechanism design (McAfee (1993)). Moreover, this particu-
lar choice of mechanism impels modelers to restrict attention to bilateral
matches  something that is di¢ cult to justify if one side of the market
randomizes over another, except in the limit when the length of time period
goes to zero.
In this paper we relax these assumptions, in a very standard monetary
exchange environment based on the models presented in the above papers,
to see how robust the central results of these models are, and to explore the
usefulness of a theory based on multilateral matching and directed search.
We use a standard urn-ball matching process generated by buyers random-
izing over sellers, and justied as the directed search mixed strategy equi-
librium recently utilized in the labor market literature. (See, for example,
Montgomery (1991), Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), and Burdett, Shi,
and Wright (2001).)1 Three di¤erent physical environments are considered,
following the historical development of the literature: two-sided indivisibil-
ity, indivisible money and divisible goods, and two-sided divisibility. We
also consider two di¤erent price determination mechanisms: ex ante price
1Rocheteau and Wright (2005) also analyse monetary models with directed search.
However, directed search in their paper takes a di¤erent form, based on the competitive
search framework developed by Moen (1997). In that setting the aggregate market is di-
vided into submarkets, each of which is frictional, but where movement across submarkets
is directed by market-makers who perform a role similar to Walrasian auctioneers.
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posting and ex post bidding (auctions). In all cases, we characterize the
steady state monetary equilibria, examine their e¢ ciency properties, and
explore the inuence of the quantity of at money supplied. Overall, a key
di¤erence between these models and those with purely random matching is
that the ratio of buyers to sellers (that is, market tightness) now inuences
the matching rate. The introduction of this new channel, through which
monetary policy can a¤ect the economy, signicantly alters the positive and
normative a¤ects of the policy.
With indivisible money and goods, as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993),
we identify restrictions on the two key parameters (the discount factor and
the supply of money) that are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of
monetary equilibria. When examining the issue of the optimal supply of
money we found that, in this environment, the expected aggregate surplus
of the economy is not strictly declining in the number of units of at money,
as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Rather, because the arrival rate for
matches is no longer parametric (but now a function of the ratio of buyers
and sellers), a positive optimal supply of money exists which maximizes
expected surplus.
With indivisible money but divisible goods we consider directed search
equilibria under di¤erent pricing mechanisms: ex ante price posting (as in
Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and ex post auctions (as in Julien, Kennes,
and King (2000)). In both settings, the supply of money now a¤ects the
expected surplus through two distinct margins: extensive and intensive.
The extensive margin is the same as in the model with indivisible goods
 through its inuence on market tightness, the money supply a¤ects the
number of matches. The intensive margin is the same as in Trejos and
Wright (1995): the equilibrium price a¤ects the marginal costs and benets
associated with production. With price posting, we nd that there exists a
quantity of money that maximizes expected surplus. Interestingly, by way
of contrast, with ex post bidding, surplus maximization cannot be attained
unless lotteries are used in the presence of bilteral matches. This somewhat
surprising result comes about because of the price dispersion inherent in the
auction mechanism: this implies that, with concave utility and convex costs,
the intensive margin condition can not be satised.
With divisible money and goods, we restrict attention to the case of ex
ante price posting and nd that we can characterize a steady state distrib-
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ution of money holdings with relative ease. This distribution has a simple
two-point support that resembles the equilibrium in the model with indivis-
ible money. This shares some of the features of the distribution found by
Molico (2004) in a model based on Trejos and Wright (1995) with divisible
money, but is much simpler  and in some respects is similar to the one
found in Lagos and Wright (2005) in quite a di¤erent setting.2 Monetary
policy in this environment has both the intensive and extensive margins
mentioned above, but now has an extra dimension to consider: how changes
in the money supply are distributed across agents. We nd, for example,
that increments to the money supply can be neutral if and only if they are
distributed only to existing money holders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
and analyses the model with two-sided indivisibility. Section 3 considers the
model with divisible goods and indivisible money. Section 4 studies the case
of two-sided divisibility. Section 5 presents a conclusion and suggestions for
further research, and an appendix contains proofs of some of the propositions
and an extra proposition not contained in the body of the paper.
2 Indivisible Goods and Money
2.1 The Model
There is a [0,1] continuum of innitely lived agents. Time is discrete and
the agents have a rate of time preference r > 0 or, equivalently, a discount
factor,  = 1=(1 + r). There is also a continuum of indivisible services (or
non-storable goods, where these goods are produced only after an agreement
to exchange). Agent i has the ability to produce one unit of one good. The
unit production cost for any agent is c  0.
Tastes are heterogenous and modelled as follows. Given any two agents
i and j, write iWj to mean i wants to consume the good that j produces-
that is i derives utility u > c from consuming what j produces if iWj and
he derives utility 0 from consuming what j produces otherwise. For any two
agents selected at random, we assume prob(iWi) = 0 and prob(jWi) = x.
To keep things simple, we also assume away the double coincidence of wants,
2 In particular, here, we do not use the day-night market structure employed in Lagos
and Wright (2005).
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(and, thereby, the possibility of direct barter) so prob(jWi j iWj) = 0:
Further, to focus on the impact of introducing multilateral matching, we
assume away the absence of any single coincidence of wants; thus, we set
x = 1:
In addition to the consumable goods, there is an object called at money.
This money consists of a xed quantity of M 2 [0; 1] indivisible units of
a storable object. Initially one (normalized) unit of money is randomly
allocated to M agents. We assume, in this section, that agents holding
money cannot produce.3 Thus no one can ever acquire more than one unit
of money, and hence all agents hold either 0 or 1 units of money.
We assume that all goods producers operate as sellers and that all money
holders operate as buyers. Thus, in equilibria with monetary exchange,
the number of buyers is given by M and the number of sellers is given by
(1   M): Let  denote the ratio of buyers to sellers (market tightness),
thus:  = M=(1  M): In each period, sellers appear identical and buyers
randomly choose which seller to visit - generating a simple urn-ball matching
process. For any two agents that meet, let 0 denote the probability that
the seller will accept money in exchange for goods. Similarly, let 1 denote
the probability that a money holder will accept the good in return for the
unit of money. Thus, monetary exchange occurs if and only if   01 > 0:
In this case, the probability of exchange for any given seller choosing 0 is
given by
() = (1  e ) = (1  e  M1 M ) (1)
where 1   e  is the probability a seller gets at least one buyer. Similarly,
the probability of exchange for a money holder (buyer) is given by:
 () = 

1  e 


= 
1 M
M
(1  e  M1 M ) (2)
where the probability
 
1  e  = incorporates the fact that the good is
rationed randomly to only one buyer in the event of multiple buyers.
Equations (1) and (2) illustrate an important di¤erence between this
framework and that of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). In their model, agents
encounter each other with the parametric Poisson arrival rate  4 so that, for
a seller, the probability of encountering a buyer is M . Similarly, for a buyer,
3This assumption is relaxed in Section 4, below.
4Using the notation from Rupert et al. (2000).
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the probability of a encountering a seller is (1 M). Thus, the associated
probabilities of monetary exchange, corresponding to the expressions in (1)
and (2) respectively, are M and (1  M): Trejos and Wright (1995),
for example, normalize by e¤ectively setting  = 1: Here, this would not be
an innocuous normalization, since the arrival rate is not parametric, but a
function of  = M=(1  M): That is, in this framework, market tightness
a¤ects arrival rates and the equilibrium number of matches.
Let V0 and V1 be the value functions of agents with 0 and 1 units of
money, respectively - i.e. sellers and buyers. Since we only consider sta-
tionary, symmetric equilibria, Vj does not depend on time or on the agents
name. The payo¤s when trading occurs are u+ V0 if a money holder, and
 c+ V1 if a producer. The value function of a producer is given by
V0() = max
0

()[V1
 
0
  c] + (1   ())V0  0	 (3)
where  represents the strategies of all buyers and other sellers, which is
taken as given. Similarly,  0 indicates the equilibrium strategies next period.
With a slight abuse of notation, the value function of a money holder is
V1 () = max
1

 ()
 
V0
 
0

+ u

+ (1   ())  V1  0	 (4)
We are now in a position to dene the relevant equilibrium.
2.2 The Equilibrium
In this paper we restrict attention to steady state symmetric equilibria.
Denition 1 A steady state symmetric monetary equilibrium is a pair
(V0(); V1()) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Equations (3) and (4) where  = 0;
(ii) The monetary exchange constraints
 c+ V1(0) > V0(0) (5)
u+ V0(
0) > V1(0) (6)
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Hereafter, we will refer to steady state symmetric equilibria simply as
"equilibria". In these equilibria,  = 0, and the value functions are:
V1 () =
 () (u (1   (1   ()))   () c)
(1  ) (1  (1   ()   ())) (7)
and
V0 () =
 () ( ()u  c (1   (1   ())))
(1  ) (1  (1   ()   ())) (8)
The di¤erence between V1 and V0 is given by
 = V1 ()  V0 () = u () + c ()
1  (1   ()   ()) : (9)
Dene the net gains from trading goods for money and money for goods
as, respectively:
0 = (V1   V0)  c (10)
1 = u  (V1   V0)
Substituting in the steady state values for V0 and V1, or for , yields
0  0() V0  0 (11)
1  0() V1  0:
The equilibrium conditions are
j
8><>:
= 1
2 (0; 1)
= 0
if j
8><>:
> 0
= 0
< 0:
(12)
Notice that, from (7), V1 > 0 for all parameter values. From (11), this
implies that 1 > 0, and from (12) this implies that 1 = 1. Therefore, to
determine where monetary equilibria exist, we need only focus on 0.
Proposition 1 Let '(; )   ()1 (1  ()) and  () = (1 e
 
 ), then
a. 0 = 0 exists as a non-monetary equilibrium everywhere in the para-
meter space.
b. 0 = 1 exists as a monetary equilibrium when c 6 '(; )u:
c. 0 = ^ =
(1 )c
 ()(u c) 2 (0; 1) exists as a monetary equilibrium when
c 6 '(; )u:
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d. No monetary equilibria exist when c > '(; )u:
Proof. Notice that 0 has the same sign as 0   ^ where ^ is dened by
u
c
=
(1  )
 (^; )
+ 1
or
^ =
(1  )c
 () (u  c) :
Then 0 = 0 is always an equilibrium since ^ > 0. Which implies
0   ^ < 0 and hence, 0 < 0. The equilibrium condition is satised and
there is an equilibrium where no one accepts at money.
Next note that ^ < 1 if
(1  )c
 () (u  c) < 1 or c <
 ()u
1  (    ()) :
This means that 0 = 1 > ^ is an equilibrium. There exists a monetary
equilibrium if the cost of producing a unit is small enough relative to other
parameters. (This is standard in search models of money, since agents must
incur a cost to obtain money, that cost must not be too high.) Since in
any well dened game there is always an odd number of equilibria, there
exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where 0 = ^. If other agents accept
money with probability ^, then one agent is indi¤erent between accepting
or rejecting money and randomizing is an equilibrium.
In simple xed-price search models of at money, such as this, it is stan-
dard to nd parameter regions for which there is no monetary equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium with 0 = 1. The associated trading constraint
0  0 is
'(; )   ()
(1  (1   ()) 
c
u
:
The LHS is strictly decreasing in , and strictly increasing in , which leads
to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For any given u and c, and assume  = 1, the unique equilib-
rium is non monetary when
a. for all  and for all  >  where  < 1 ( M < 1) is given by uc =
(1 )
 ()
+ 1;
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b. for all  and for all  <  where  is given by uc =
(1 )
 () + 1.
Intuitively, too many coins chasing too few goods and impatience elimi-
nate the monetary equilibrium.
2.3 Monetary Policy
Consider a social planner that can choose M to maximize surplus, but must
respect all other constraints imposed by the decentralized economy. This
is essentially a static problem because the quantity of buyers (holders of
money) is independent of any past decisions. Suppose that a monetary
equilibrium exists whenever feasible. In this case, the objective of a central
authority (social planner) who controls M is to maximize surplus:
max
M
Y = X(M) (u  c) (13)
such that
 ()
1  (1   () 
c
u
(14)
where the number of transactions each period is given by
X(M) = (1 M)

1  e (M=(1 M))

(15)
and (u c) is a constant. Maximizing surplus is equivalent to maximizing the
number of matches (that is, X(M) in (15)), which is achieved if the quantity
of money satises: M=(1 M) = 1:146, or M = 0:533. In principle, the
money acceptance constraint may a¤ect the decision on how much money
to allocate to this economy. In particular, from the Corollary above, there
exists an M < 1 beyond which there is only a non-monetary equilibrium.
The question then becomes whether or not M < M . From the Corollary,
there is also a , below which there is only a non-monetary equilibrium.
To assess the signicance of these constraints on the determination of opti-
mal stock of money, Figure 1 below illustrates both the number of matches
and the LHS of (14) for di¤erent values of M and : In this picture, the
thick black line at the bottom is the number of matches as a function of M ,
which peaks when M = 0:533. The middle (dashed) line is the value of the
LHS of (14) if  is small ( = :9), corresponding to very lengthy (annual)
9
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Figure 1: Matching function and '(; ).
transactions. The top (dotted) line is the value of the LHS of (14) if  is
moderately large ( = :99), corresponding to (roughly) weekly transactions.
Clearly, at the value ofM = 0:533, the LHS of (14) is above 0.75 for  = :9
and very close to 1.0 for  = :99: Thus, the cost/utility ratio c=u would
have to be very high in order for the constraint to be binding. Therefore, in
this model of monetary exchange, with indivisible goods and money, under
reasonable parameter values, the monetary acceptance constraint does not
inuence the optimal choice of monetary policy, and we can reasonably pre-
sume that optimal monetary balances are those that maximize the number
of transactions.
2.3.1 A Comparison with Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)
In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), agents face a parametric Poisson arrival rate
 so, in a monetary equilibrium, the number of transactions is given by
eX(M) =  (1 M)
and the surplus is therefore
Y =  (1 M) (u  c)
which is strictly decreasing in M . Kiyotaki and Wright therefore focus
attention, instead, on maximizing a social welfare function
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W =MV1 + (1 M)V0
which has a non-zero optimal M:
3 Divisible Goods and Indivisible Money
We now relax the assumption of indivisible goods, along the lines of Shi
(1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), and consider two alternative pricing
mechanisms. Under the rst pricing method, producers announce the terms
of trade prior to matching. In this setting, prices are determined ex ante
through price posting. Under the second pricing method, the terms of trade
are determined by local market conditions, which are revealed only after
matching. In this setting, prices are determined ex post through a bidding
game (or auction). As before, we assume that money holders are always
buyers and thus there is never a chance of direct trade.
Goods are now perfectly divisible. Let u(q) be the utility of consuming q
units of ones consumption good and c(q) the disutility of producing q units
of ones production good. Following Trejos and Wright (1995), we assume
u(0) = c(0) = 0; u0(0) > c0(0) = 0; u0(q) > 0; c0(q) > 0; u00(q)  0; and
c00(q)  0; for q > 0; with at least one of the weak inequalities strict. For
future reference, we dene q by u0(q) = c0(q). Also, there is a bq > 0 such
that u(bq) = c(bq). It is important to understand, though, what is meant
by quantity in this setting. In Trejos and Wright (1995), q is interpreted
as either the quality of a service or the quantity of a perishable good. In
this model, the service interpretation is valid, but the goods interpretation
requires another assumption: due to the possibility of multilateral matching,
we need to restrict sellers to serve only one buyer at a time.
3.1 Ex ante pricing (price posting)
In this subsection, we consider a model that is similar to the (non-monetary)
price posting model presented in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). The main
di¤erence is that, in that model, sellers have one indivisible unit of a good
to sell, which can be priced according to a perfectly divisible numeraire.
Here, instead, sellers have a perfectly divisible good that they can produce
and sell, in exchange for a unit of the indivisible at money. Each seller
announces, in advance of matching, the quantity level, q; at which they will
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produce, implying a nominal price p = 1=q. In both cases, sellers compete
in prices; however, the indivisibility is now on the other side of the market,
and sellers are attempting to acquire at money In e¤ect then, here, sellers
bid for money.5
The equilibrium quantity (price) announcement is solved by a simple
game for which we nd a Nash equilibrium. We start by assuming that
all sellers but one announce a quantity level q, but one seller considers
announcing a level eq 6= q: Buyers observe the announcements and select a
trading partner from among the deviating and non-deviating sellers using a
mixed strategy. The Nash equilibrium is a value q from which no unilateral
deviation is protable and buyers select among the sellers using the same
mixed strategy.
To be precise, we provide the following denition.
Denition 2 An equilibrium quantity announcement is a qe satisfying
qe = argmax
~q
~V0 (~q; q)
where ~q is a deviation for a seller, taking as given all other sellersstrategies
q, and ~V0 is the value associated with the deviation. In any deviation, a seller
correctly anticipates that buyersmixed strategies solve
~V1 (~q; q) = V1 (~q; q) :
where ~V1 is the value for a buyer from selecting a deviating seller.
Therefore, in equilibrium, qe = ~q = q:
3.1.1 The non-deviant sellers
The present values to non-deviant sellers, and to buyers selecting non-
deviant sellers are:
V0 (~q; q) = 
 
V1
 
q0e

)  c(q)+ (1  )V0  q0e (16)
5 It is worth noting that this pricing environment, in common with Shi (1995) and
Trejos and Wright (1995), requires a lot of commitment, and the following results lean
heavily on this assumption. Alternatively, one could consider a setting in which sellers
could physically produce and announce truthfully their production ex ante in order to
attract buyers. The di¤erence in that setting is that the production cost is sunk in the
sense of being unavoidable in the case of no trade. It turns out that there is no monetary
equilibrium under this assumption. The explanation is that the hold up problem is so
severe that sellers will not produce at all or the equilibrium quantity is zero. We conjecture
that this is also the case in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995).
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and
V1(~q; q) =  

u(q) + V0
 
q0e

)

+ (1   )V1
 
q0e

(17)
respectively, where q0e is the equilibrium quantity in the next period.
The probabilities in the above value functions are a¤ected by buyers
mixed strategies, captured by the buyer/seller ratio , which is a function
of ~q and q: To save on notation we write   (~q; q). The probabilities of
trade for sellers and buyers, respectively, are given by:
 = 1  e  (18)
and
 =
1  e 

: (19)
Here, also, to keep notation to a minimum, we restrict attention to monetary
equilibria where  = 1: The expressions above can characterize both a non-
monetary and a monetary equilibrium. In particular, if q = 0, then buyers
receive nothing in exchange for money and if q > 0, sellers are trading goods
for money.
3.1.2 The deviant seller
The value function for a buyer selecting the deviant seller is
~V1(~q; q) = ~ 

u(~q) + V0
 
q0e

+ (1  ~ )V1
 
q0e

(20)
where ~ = 1 e
 ~
~
is the buyers probability of trade and ~ = (~q; q) is the
buyer/seller ratio summarizing the buyers mixed strategies over the devi-
ating seller and non-deviating sellers. Buyers mixed strategies are chosen
such that
~V1(~q; q) = V1(~q; q) (21)
where
V1(~q; q) =  

u(~q) + V0
 
q0e

+ (1   )V1
 
q0e

: (22)
The deviant sellers value function is
~V0 (~q; q) = ~
 
V1
 
q0e

)  c(~q)+ (1  ~)V0  q0
where ~ = 1  e ~ is the probability of trade.
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The best deviation solves:
max
~q2R+
~V0 (~q; q) (23)
s.t.
(i) ~V1(~q; q) = V1(~q; q)
(ii)  c(~q) + V1(q0e) > V0(q0e)
(iii) u(~q) + V0(q
0
e) > V1(q0e)
Constraint (i) represents the fact that, in a deviation, a seller anticipate
buyersbehavior correctly in their mixed strategies. Using (20) and (21),
this can be re-written as:
(i)0 e = [u(q)  (q0e)]
[u(eq)  (q0e)] (24)
where (q0e) = V1(q0e)  V0(q0e).
Constraints (ii) and (iii) are the exchange constraints. These two con-
straints simplify to:
(ii)0 eqmax 6 c 1    q0e (25)
(iii)0 eqmin > u 1    q0e (26)
The deviant sellers problem then is reduced to:
max
~q2[eqmin;eqmax] ~V0 (~q; q) (27)
s.t. e = [u(q)  (q0e)]
[u(eq)  (q0e)] 
Notice that the constraint summarizes buyers reaction functions with
respect to the deviating and non-deviating sellers choices, and hence, is
always binding.
In a symmetric equilibrium ~q = q = qe, ~ = ; ~ =  ; and ~ = :6 In
steady state qe = q0e. To simplify notation, for the remainder of this section,
we write the equilibrium qe as q only. (The subscript was introduced only
to di¤erentiate equilibrium from quantities chosen by non-deviant sellers.)
6The symmetric equilibrium is well-known to be unique in this type of environment.
See, for example, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001).
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Proposition 2 In the symmetric steady-state equilibrium, the quantity an-
nouncement by sellers is characterized by:7
c0(q)
u0(q)
=
(   1)
(1     )
[(q)  c(q)]
[u(q)  (q)] : (28)
Proof. See Appendix.
The steady state symmetric equilibrium quantity implies ~V0(~q; q) = V0(~q; q) =
V0(q) and ~V1(~q; q) = V1(~q; q) = V1(q). Using this in (16) and (17), the steady
state values become
V0(q) =
 ( u(q)  (1  (1   )) c(q))
(1  )(1  (1     )) (29)
and
V1(q) =
 (u(q)  (1  (1  )) c(q))
(1  )(1  (1     )) : (30)
It follows immediately that, as long as q > 0,
(q) = V1(q)  V0(q) =  u(q) + c(q)
(1  (1     )) > 0 (31)
for all parameter values of  and . The link between the trading constraints
(or net gains from trade) and the values at the steady state are established
as
0(q) = ((q))  c(q)  0() V0(q)  0 (32)
1(q) = u(q)  ((q))  0() V1(q)  0:
As in the previous section, but now with production, V1(q)  0 for all
parameter values. The buyers always want to participate in this market, a
consequence of the at money assumption. Therefore we need only focus
on the sellersvalue function to determine the condition for existence of a
steady state monetary equilibrium (i.e. when q > 0).
Denition 3 A symmetric steady state equilibrium is a triple (q; V0; V1)
satisfying the following conditions:
7Astute readers may notice that equation (28) shares a similarity with the equilibrium
condition in standard search models of money using pairwise matching and bargaining
(e.g., Trejos and Wright (1995)).
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(i) ~q = q is the symmetric Nash equilibrium which solves the sellers prob-
lem (27) of the ex ante game characterized by equation (28) taking
V0(q) and V1(q) as given;
(ii) the value functions V0 and V1 satisfy (29) and (30), taking q as given;
(iii) the sellers exchange constraint evaluated at q is satised:
0(q)  0 (33)
From (25) and (32) any steady state equilibrium value of q 2 [0; qmax] is
both a necessary and su¢ cient condition for V0 (q)  0, for given ; :
3.1.3 Equilibrium
The existence and equilibrium properties of the model are now stated and
derived. As in the previous section, the steady state equilibrium is referred
to simply as an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For any  2 (0; 1) and M 2 (0; 1), in the steady state, there
exists a non-monetary equilibrium and a unique monetary equilibrium with
q 2 (0; q^).8
Proof. First, the non-monetary equilibrium q = V0 = V1 = 0 is easily
established since it satises all the conditions from the denition of an equi-
librium. To show existence of the monetary equilibrium, write the following
transformation function representing the rst derivative of the sellers ob-
jective function evaluated at the steady state symmetric equilibrium q :
T (q) = g()[(q)  c(q)]u0(q)  [u(q)  (q)]c0(q)
where(q) is the steady state value from equation (31) and g() =

1 
 + 1

.
It implies that T (q) = 0 represents the rst-order condition and, in the
steady state, the equation (28). To show existence, observe that T (0) = 0,
and T (q), is continuous since u() and c() are continuous, and recall that
8The assumption that c0(0) = 0 (which is standard in these models) is important here.
If, instead, c0(0) > 0 then monetary equilibria exist only in a restricted region of the
parameter space  as in the previous section. We consider this case in Proposition 10,
given in the appendix.
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only q 2 [0; qmax], are equilibrium steady state candidates. Now given the
assumption that c0(0) = 0,
T 0(0) = g()[0(0)]u0(0) > 0
for all  2 (0; 1) and  < 1. Next, when q = qmax then V0(qmax) = 0 ()
(qmax)  c(qmax) = 0, and since V1(qmax) > 0, we nd
T (qmax) =  [u(qmax)  ]c0(qmax) < 0,
which shows that the equilibrium is such that q < qmax < q^. By continuity
of T (q) there exist a q 2 (0; qmax) such that T (q) = 0.
Uniqueness is shown by setting T (q) = 0 and obtaining the rst-order
condition
c0(q)
u0(q)
= g()
[(q)  c(q)]
[u(q)  (q)] : (34)
The LHS is weakly increasing (non-decreasing) in q and the RHS is strictly
decreasing in q for any  and . It is easily shown using LHopitals rule that
evaluated at q = 0, the LHSjQ=0 < RHSjQ=0 is equivalent to T 0(0) > 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique value of q for which the rst-order condition
is satised, and hence, a unique monetary equilibrium.
An example of this equilibrium with u(q) = q, c(q) = q2 and  = 1 with
 = :99 is illustrated in Figure 2.
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
q
u(q),c(q), V0(q), V1(q), T(q)
Figure 2:  = :99;  = 1 ;blackT (Q), Blue is V0, Red is V1.
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Using the Implicit Function Theorem with (34) we write the equilibrium
as q(; ) and derive some properties of the monetary equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For any given  2 (0; 1), the equilibrium q 2 (0; qmax) is decreas-
ing in  (hence M) for all  2 (0;1), with lim!0 qmax = q^ and q(0) = 0.
For any given , the equilibrium q is strictly increasing in .
Proof. (See Appendix)
The above results suggest that there exist parameter values for which the
equilibrium can be e¢ cient at the intensive margin. The following proposi-
tion establishes that.
Proposition 4 For any given , there exists a  for which the monetary
equilibrium is e¢ cient: q(; ) = q where u0(q) = c0(q). Otherwise the
monetary equilibrium is ine¢ cient as follows: if  ?  then q 7 q.
Proof. First we must show that q < qmax. We know that
V0(qmax) = 0, D0 = 0
where D0 = [ u(q)  (1   (1   )) c(q)]. At q, the rst-order condition
is 1 = g()D0D1 or D0 = D1=g() > 0. By concavity of V0, it follows that
V0(q
) > 0, and hence, q < qmax. The remainder of the proof follows from
Lemma 1.
3.2 Ex post pricing (auctions)
In the previous subsection the terms of trade were determined ex ante: prior
to the matching allocation. As noted, this pricing mechanism assumes com-
mitment on the part of the sellers. Although one could nd ways to ratio-
nalize this commitment, it is interesting to investigate alternatives where
the terms of trade are determined ex post. Since we allow for the possibility
of multilateral matches to form, the natural ex post mechanism to consider
is auctions. In this environment, and throughout this section of the paper,
it is common knowledge that each buyer has only one unit of at money.
Bidding, here, therefore takes the following structure. Because the margin of
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adjustment is on the sellersside (the quantity choice of the divisible good)
a bid from a buyer is proposition of a quantity required in exchange for his
unit of at money. It follows that, within a multilateral match, where one
seller is matched with several buyers, competition between the buyers re-
duces the minimal quantity of output acceptable for the unit of money. (In
e¤ect, this is a procurement auction, where the unit of money corresponds
to the xed budget of the buyer, and the quantity level is analogous to the
cost of input.)9 In all other respects, the model remains the same.
The matching process determines the number, n; of buyers matched
with a particular seller. As is usual with auction mechanisms, the outcome
depends on the number of buyers bidding. Let q be the vector of possible
outcomes from the auction in any period. Due to the common knowledge
assumption, the bidding outcome is reduced to two possible cases: when
n = 1 (a pairwise match) and when n > 1 (a multilateral match). Let the
outcome of the auction be qp when n = 1 and qm when n > 1. The value
functions for sellers and buyers, respectively are:
V0(q) = p[ c(qp) + V1(q0)]
+m[ c(qm) + V1(q0)] + (1  m   p)V0(q0) (35)
where, for a seller, p = e
 is the probability of a pairwise match, m =
1  e   e  is the probability of a multilateral match, 1  m  p is the
probability of no match, and q = (qp; qm) is the vector of possible outcomes.
Similarly, the value function for a buyer is given by:
V1(q) =  p[u(qp)+V0(q
0)]+ m[u(qm)+V0(q
0)]+(1  m  p)V1(q0) (36)
where, for a buyer,  p = e
  is the probability of a pairwise match for
a buyer,  m =
1 e 
 is the joint probability of a multilateral match and
winning the bidding game, and 1  m  p is the probability of not winning
the bidding game.
We are now ready to consider the determination of quantities in equilib-
rium. From the structure of the auction, it should be clear that the quantity
resulting from a pairwise match will be higher than from a multilateral match
9Also known as the Minnesota approach to buying a roond. (Ref: Wright (2005).)
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(which we demonstrate in Lemma 2 below). In any pairwise matching event,
the buyer is bidding alone and thus proposes a (high) quantity level solving
q = argmax
q

u(q) + V0(q
0)
	
(37)
s.t.
 c(q) + V1(q0) > V0(q0) (38)
where the constraint is required for the seller to participate in trade.10 This
has the obvious solution:
q = c 1(0) (39)
where 0 = V1(q0)  V0(q0) as before. Thus, qp = q:
In a multilateral matching event, the seller has multiple buyers and thus
the buyers propose a quantity level that cannot be beat by other buyers.
This is a simple Bertrand pricing game - the outcome of a simple auction.
Therefore, the equilibrium bid is one where each buyer is indi¤erent between
trading and not trading (i.e., remaining a buyer in the next period). Since
all bids are the same in this scenario in equilibrium, whether or not a par-
ticular buyer wins the auction, he receives the same expected payo¤. The
equilibrium quantity can therefore be found from the following problem:
q = argmax
q
 c(q) + V1(q0)	 (40)
s.t.
u(q) + V0(q
0) > V1(q0) (41)
This has the solution:
q = u 1(0): (42)
10 In a pairwise match such as this, one could think of alternative ways of determining
the price, (in particular: bargaining). Here, to be consistent with auctions, in the event
of pairwise matches, the buyer has the power to push the seller to her outside option with
the minimum acceptable quantity demanded or required. Interestingly, Halko, Kultti, and
Niinimaki (2004) show that this mechanism is evolutionary stable, while the hybrid mech-
anism with bargaining is not. In section 3.2.1, below, we also consider the introduction of
lotteries with pairwise matches.
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Thus, qm = q. The following lemma veries the existence of price dis-
persion in any candidate equilibrium and, as argued above, prices with mul-
tilateral matching are higher than with pairwise matching. 11
Lemma 2 For all 0 > 0, (q; q) 2 (0; q^)2 and q < q; where q^ is dened by
u(q^) = c(q^). Otherwise, 0 = 0 if and only if q = q = 0 and 0 = ^ > 0, if
and only if q = q = q^.
Proof. In appendix.
In the steady state, q = q0, and using(39) and (42) in (35) and (36), we
nd the steady state values:
V0(q) =
m
 
 pu(q) 
 
1    1   p c(q)
(1  )  1    1   p   m (43)
and
V1(q) =
 p
 
(1   (1  m))u(q)  mc(q)

(1  )  1    1   p   m : (44)
It follows immediately that as long as q > 0,
(q) = V1(q)  V0(q) =
u(q) p + c(q)m
1  (1   p   m)
> 0 (45)
and, using Lemma 2, it follows that V1(q) > 0 for all parameter values. Once
again, this implies that, for existence of a steady state equilibrium we need
only establish conditions under which V0(q) > 0:
Denition 4 A steady state equilibrium is a tuple (q; q; V0; V1) satisfying
the following conditions:
1. q and q satisfy (39) and (42) respectively, taking V0 and V1 as given;
2. V0 and V1 satisfy (43) and (44).
The existence and uniqueness is stated in the following proposition.
11Notice that price dispersion occurs in this auction setting where the buyer has the bar-
gaining power in pairwise matches and the seller has the power with multilateral matches.
Hence, here, the bargaining power within a match is determined by the matching process.
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Proposition 5 For any  2 (0; 1) and M 2 (0; 1), in the steady state, there
exists a non-monetary equilibrium and a unique monetary equilibrium with
0 < q < q < q^.12
Proof. First note that q and q are maximized values such that respectively
a seller and a buyer is indi¤erent between trading or not. Therefore, we do
not have to worry about participation constraints. For any  2 (0; 1) and
M 2 (0; 1) the existence of a non-monetary equilibrium is immediate since
q = q = V0 = V1 = 0 satises all the equilibrium conditions. To show the
existence of a monetary equilibrium with 0 < q < q, insert the steady state
value functions into (39) and (42) to get
c(q) = 
 pu(q) + mc(q)
1  (1   b   m)
(46)
and
u(q) = c(q): (47)
Therefore, quantities are linked by a strictly convex function q = u 1(c(q)).
Using this into (46) gives
c(q) = 
 pu(q) + mc(u
 1(c(q)))
1  (1   p   m)
 H(q):
Dene T (q) = H(q)  c(q). Clearly T (q) is continuous, T (0) = 0, and
T 0(0) =   pu
0(0)
1 (1  p m) > 0 for all parameter values satisfying the assump-
tions of the proposition. Observe that T (q^) =  u(q^)

(1 )
1 (1  p m)

< 0
meaning that q = q^ cannot be an equilibrium. By continuity and the Weier-
strass Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist a q > 0, such that T (q) = 0
and q = u 1(c(q)) > 0. This implies  > 0 and from Lemma 2 we have
q < q. Therefore, 0 < q < q < q^.
To show uniqueness, observe that H(q) is strictly increasing and a linear
combination of a concave and a convex function. This implies that there is
a unique inexion point below which H(q) is concave and above which H(q)
is convex. Therefore, the function T (q) has also a unique concave and a
unique convex portion. Since T (0) = 0, T 0(0) > 0 and T (q^) < 0, it implies
12As in the ex ante pricing model, changing the assumptions to allow for c0(0) > 0
restricts the parameter space for which a monetary equilibrium exist. The proof is similar
to the one provided for the ex ante case available in appendix.
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that there must be a unique value q 2 (0; q^) such that T (q) = 0. Since
u(q) = c(q) then q > 0 is also unique.
Figure 3 provides a numerical example with u(q) = q and c(q) = q2 with
di¤erent values of .
10.750.50.250
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0.75
0.5
0.25
0
q
u(q),c(q),T(q)
Figure 3: Ex post pricing equilibrium: Red is c(q), Blue is u(q); Green is
T (q); The x axis is q:
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we now derive key properties of
the monetary equilibrium.
Lemma 3 For any given  2 (0; 1), the equilibrium values (q; q) 2 (0; q^)2
are decreasing in  (henceM) for all 0 <  <1, with lim!0 q = lim!0 q =
q^ and q(0) = q(0) = 0. For any given , the equilibrium values (q; q) are
strictly increasing in .
Proof. (See Appendix)
Proposition 6 The steady state equilibrium of the ex post pricing game is
ine¢ cient.
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Proof. From the assumptions on u(q) and c(q), we know that q is unique.
From Lemma 2, we know that, in any monetary equilibrium q < q: It follows
immediately that we cannot have q = q = q:
It is worth noting that this proposition does not rule out the existence
of some e¢ cient matches (for example, if either q = q or q = q) however,
in equilibrium, we can never have all matches e¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency may
entail either underproduction in all matches (with high  or low ), over-
production in all matches (with low  or high ), or underproduction in
some and overproduction in others. Interestingly, even if the average pro-
duction level is equal to the e¢ cient level (q), the price dispersion inherent
in auctions guarantees that the equilibrium will always be ine¢ cient
It is also worth noting that this ine¢ ciency is not due to the usual holdup
problem common in search models with pairwise matching and bargaining.
In particular, the equilibrium in this model can be rationalized as a directed
search equilibrium. In models of this type, allowing sellers to announce re-
serve prices ex ante, and buyers directing their search using mixed strategies,
the equilibrium reserve price equals the sellersoutside option and buyers
perfectly randomize as they do here (see Julien, Kennes, and King (2000)).
3.2.1 Using a lottery in pairwise matching events
In light of the ine¢ ciency result of the above ex post pricing mechanism,
we now consider the following alternative. Here, in multilateral matching
events, the mechanism is precisely the same as above; however, in pairwise
matching events, we allow the buyer to propose a lottery. In particular, in
pairwise matches, the buyer proposes a contract asking the seller to produce
a quantity q and a lottery in which the seller receives the buyers money
with probability  2 [0; 1].13 In this case, the buyer solves
max
q;
fu(q) + V0 + (1  )V1g
s:t:
 c(q) + V0 + (1  )V1  V1
  1:
13See Berensten, Molico and Wright (2002) for the implications of using lottery on
money in a model with pairwise matching and bargaining.
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The introduction of this mechanism produces the following results.
Proposition 7 For  < 1, there exists a  such that:
(i) for all  > , there exists a non-monetary and a unique monetary equi-
librium with  = 1. The monetary equilibrium has the characteristic
0 < q < q < q^.
(ii) for all     , there exists a non-monetary equilibrium and two
monetary equilibria with  2 (0; 1). One monetary equilibrium has
relatively high  and q0 < q = q. The other equilibrium has relatively
low  and q1 > q = q.
(iii) for all  < , there exists a non-monetary equilibrium and a unique
monetary equilibrium where 0 = q < q = q.
Proof. See appendix.
The rst part of the proposition says that if money supply is high enough,
o¤ering a lottery is not an equilibrium choice. The second part shows
that for a middle range of the money supply, there are multiple equilib-
ria, and the quantity exchanged in pairwise matches is e¢ cient. The last
part demonstrates that for low enough money supply, exchanges occur only
under pairwise matches with a lottery on money. Moreover, these exchanges
are e¢ cient.
This mechanism shares some features with the ex ante pricing implica-
tions as exemplied in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 As  ! 1, there exist a  such that the unique monetary
equilibrium converges to q = q.
This corollary follows again from the lemmas in the proof of Proposition
7 in the appendix where one can observe that as  ! 1, then F 0(q) ! 0.
This result is similar to the ex ante price posting outcome as stated in
Proposition 4. Namely, an e¢ cient monetary equilibrium is possible with
no price dispersion.
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3.3 Optimal monetary policy
With divisible and endogenous goods production, any discussion of op-
timal policy must consider not only the number of matches (X(M) =
(1 M)  1  e (M=(1 M)) as in Section 2) but also the surplus from each
match, as measured by u(q(M))   c(q(M)). Within any period, expected
surplus is the product of the two.
We consider two di¤erent cases. In the rst, the policymaker can control
both M and q directly and independently. In the second, the policymaker
can control only M , and must accept the equilibrium response of q(M):
3.3.1 Choosing M and q Independently
The policymakers problem is:
max
fM;qg
Y = (1 M)

1  e (M=(1 M))

[u(q)  c(q)] :
The solution to this problem is given by:
M = 0:533
u0(q) = c0(q)
These two equations characterize optimality along the extensive margin
and the intensive margin respectively. Clearly, optimality along the exten-
sive margin is precisely the same as in Section 2 here, the policymaker
seeks to maximize the number of matches, as before. Similarly, optimality
along the intensive margin is precisely the e¢ ciency condition considered
above.
3.3.2 Choosing M when q = q(M)
The policymakers problem is:
max
fMg
Y = (1 M)

1  e (M=(1 M))

[u(q(M))  c(q(M))]
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Assuming concavity of the objective function, the rst-order condition
is:
X 0(M) (u(q(M))  c(q(M))) +X(M)  u0(q(M))  c0(q(M)) q0(M) = 0
where the rst term is the impact on a change in the stock of money on
the extensive margin and the second the impact on the intensive margin.
Optimality along the extensive margin is given X 0(M) = 0 and the e¢ cient
intensive margin is given by u0(q(M)) = c0(q(M)). In general, there is no
reason to presume that optimality along these two margins will coincide.
The function q(M), of course, depends on the specic pricing mechanism
used. With ex ante price posting, this is determined by (34). In principle,
then, with price posting, surplus maximization is possible through judicious
monetary policy. With ex post auctions, as pointed out above, since opti-
mality along the intensive margin is possible only in the presence of lotteries,
surplus maximization is possible only in that case.14
4 Divisible Goods and Money
We now relax the assumption that money is indivisible. We assume, instead,
that any agent can hold any amount m 2 R+. We restrict attention to the
ex ante price posting mechanism, since this is simple to work with and (as
shown above) admits equilibria that maximize expected surplus. In all other
respects, the model and general notation remain the same as in Section
3.1. In Section 3.1, as in Trejos and Wright (1995), agents are forced to
alternate between acting as buyers and sellers after each trade because of
the indivisibility of money. Once a buyer has made a trade, by disposing of
his unit of money, he has no choice but to become a seller next period. With
divisible money, it is not clear that a buyer who traded would act a seller
next period. For example, if the price paid is only half his money holdings,
he could, in principle, a¤ord to act as a buyer for two consecutive periods.
14As mentioned above, Trejos and Wright (1995) do not consider the problem of surplus
maximization in their model. Rather, they consider the problem of welfare maximization
with the equilibrium values of buyers and sellers in the social welfare function, weighted
by the proportions of each, with parametric matching rates una¤ected by the choice of
M .
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Moreover, an agent may choose to accumulate money holdings by acting as
a seller over consecutive periods. In this section, we allow agents to choose
whether to act as sellers (i = 0) or buyers (i = 1) at the beginning of each
period. We show that, in e¤ect, the Trejos and Wright (1995) setting with
alternating identities is a symmetric stationary Markov strategy equilibrium
with a stationary degenerate distribution of money holdings.
We assume that there is a set of sellers S  [0; 1] with mass 0 and a
set of buyers B  [0; 1] with mass 1, such that 0 + 1 = 1. We consider
the distribution (mi; i); i = 0; 1, where mi is the money holding of agent
of type i, and i is the fraction (measure) of agent i holding money mi, to
be a state variable. To keep the analysis simple, we consider the following
initial distribution of money holdings:
(mi; i) =
(
(m1; 1) = (m;)
(m0; 0) = (0; 1  )
That is, a fraction  of agents holds the same number of units of money
m > 0; and the remaining fraction 1  holds zero units. (In other words, the
initial distribution of money holdings is degenerate.) We will show that this
initial distribution can be a steady state Markov equilibrium distribution. To
proceed, we need to keep the notation general to account for the possibility
for agents of type i to change their money holding.
In a way analogous to that used in Section 3.1, each seller announces,
in advance of matching, a quantity level q(m0;m1) and a required money
transfer d(m0;m1), which potentially can depend on money holdings by
sellers and buyers. As a consequence, the implied price is given by p = d=q:
We will refer to the pair (m0;m1)  [q(m0;m1); d(m0;m1)] as a contract,
but to simplify notation we write   [q; d].
The equilibrium  announcement is solved by a simple game for which
we nd a Nash equilibrium. We start by assuming that all sellers but one
announce a contract , and one seller considers announcing a level e 6=
. Agents who decide to act as buyers observe the announcements and
select a trading partner from among the deviating and non-deviating sellers
using a mixed strategy. The added di¢ culty here is the fact that a part
of the deviating contract, namely the money transfer ~d, a¤ects the value in
subsequent periods. We therefore focus on Markov strategies: in deviating,
a seller only cares about the impact of his deviation on the value next period.
The Markov equilibrium is a value  from which no unilateral deviation is
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protable and buyers select among the sellers using the same mixed strategy.
The value functions for sellers and buyers are now written as V0(m0; )
and V1(m1; ), where mi is the state variable. We simplify the notation by
omitting the dependence of the values on distribution of money holdings
which is also a state variable.
To be precise, we provide the following denition.
Denition 5 A Markov equilibrium contract announcement is a e satis-
fying
e = argmax
~
~V0 (m0; ~; )
where ~ is a deviation for a seller, taking as given all other sellersstrate-
gies , and the agents choice of type next period as given. ~V0 is the value
associated with the deviation. In any deviation, a seller correctly anticipates
that buyersmixed strategies solve
~V1 (m1; ~; ) = V1 (m1; ~; ) :
where ~V1 is the value for a buyer from selecting a deviating seller.
Therefore, in equilibrium, e = ~ = :
4.1 The non-deviant sellers
The present values for non-deviant sellers, and to buyers selecting non-
deviant sellers are, respectively:
V0(m0; ~; ) = 
 c(q) + V (m0 + d; 0e)+ (1  )V0(m0; 0e) (48)
and
V1(m1; ~; ) =  

u(q) + V (m1   d; 0e)

+ (1   )V1(m1; 0e) (49)
where 0e is the equilibrium contract in the next period, and V (; 0e) is the
value for an agent next period (which will depend on the choice of being a
buyer or a seller).15
The probabilities in the above value functions are the same as in Section
3.1. However, here, the buyers to sellers ratio is  = 1  . Also, again, we
15Embedded in equations (48) and (49) is the assumption that agents do not change
their type until they perform transactions, as in Trejos and Wright (1995).
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restrict attention to monetary equilibria where  = 1. The expressions above
can characterize both non-monetary and monetary equilibria. In particular,
if q = 0, then buyers receive nothing in exchange for money and if q > 0,
sellers are trading goods for money.
4.2 The deviant seller
The value function for a buyer selecting the deviant seller is
~V1(m1; ~; ) = ~ 
h
u(~q) + V

m1   ~d; 0e
i
+ (1  ~ )V1
 
m1; 
0
e

(50)
where the probabilities are the same as in Section 3.1. Buyers mixed strate-
gies are chosen such that
~V1(m1; ~; ) = V1(m1; ~; ) (51)
where
V1(m1; ~; ) =  

u(q) + V
 
m1   d; 0e

+ (1   )V1
 
m1; 
0
e

: (52)
The deviant sellers value function is
~V0 (m0; ~; ) = ~

V

m0 + ~d; 
0
e

  c(~q)

+ (1  ~)V0
 
m0; 
0
e

where once more, the probabilities are the same as in Section 3.1. Since
agents are allowed to choose whether to act as a buyer or a seller each
period, the value is dened as
V
 
m0i; 
0
e

= max
h2[0;1]

hV0
 
m0i; 
0
e

+ (1  h)V1
 
m0i; 
0
e
	
(53)
where h is the agents Markov strategy as a function of the history of play
last period summarized by h 2 f0; 1g, meaning that the agent was a seller,
h = 0, or a buyer, h = 1, and m0i is the money holding next period which
depends on whether the agent was a seller or a buyer.
The best deviation solves:
max
~2R+
~V0 (m0; ~; ) (54)
s.t.
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(i) ~V1(m1; ~; ) = V1(m1; ~; )
(ii)  c(~q) + V (m0 + ~d; 0e) > V0(m0; 0e)
(iii) u(~q) + V (m1   ~d; 0e) > V1(m1; 0e)
(iv) ~d 6 m1
Constraint (i) represents the fact that, in a deviation, buyers anticipate
sellersbehavior correctly in their mixed strategies. Using (50) and (51),
this can be re-written as:
(i)0 e = [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i (55)
The trading constraints (ii) and (iii) simplify to:
(ii)0 eqmax 6 c 1 m0;m0 + ~d; 0e (56)
(iii)0 eqmin > u 1 m1;m1   ~d; 0e
The deviant sellers problem then is reduced to:
max
f~q2[eqmin;eqmax]; ~dg ~V0 (m0; ~; ) (57)
s.t
(i)00 e = [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i (58)
(ii)00 ~d 6 m1 (59)
In a symmetric Markov equilibrium ~ =  = e, ~ = ; ~ =  ; and
~ = . To simplify notation, for the remainder of this section, we write the
equilibrium e as  only.
Proposition 8 The symmetric Markov equilibrium contract announcement
 = (q; d) by sellers is characterized by:
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1.
c0(q)
u0(q)
=
(   1)
(1     )
[(V (m0 + d; 
0)  V0(m0; 0))  c(q)]
[u(q)  (V1(m1; 0)  V (m1   d; 0))] : (60)
2. d(m) = m1 = m
Proof. See Appendix.
In a symmetric equilibrium we have ~V0(m0; ~; ) = V0(m0; ~; ) = V0(m0; )
and ~V1(m1; ~; ) = V1(m1; ~; ) = V1(m1; ). Furthermore, from Proposi-
tion 8 and the initial distribution assumption, we have, in equilibrium:
m0 = 0
m1 = m
We are now ready to analyze the decision to act as sellers of buyers at the
beginning of a period given the symmetric equilibrium contract announce-
ments. Rewrite the value function for an agent who decided to act as a seller
using (48) and (49), and (53) at the symmetric equilibrium:
V0(0; ) = 

 c(q) + 

max
02[0;1]

0V0
 
m; 0

+ (1  0)V1
 
m; 0
	
+ (1  )V0(0; 0) (61)
and for an agent who decided to act as a buyer:
V1(m; ) =  

u(q) + 

max
12[0;1]

1V0
 
0; 0

+ (1  1)V1
 
0; 0
	
+ (1   )V1(m; 0) (62)
It is quite clear that deciding to be a buyer next period without money
is a dominated strategy, that is V1 (0; ) = 0, and 1 = 1. We are left with
V1(m; ) =  

u(q) + V0
 
0; 0

] + (1   )V1(m; 0)

: (63)
Therefore, any agent who was initially a seller will become a buyer upon
a successful trade. The decision to be a buyer or a seller next period, given
that an agent is a seller this period is not as straightforward. If a seller
chooses to be a buyer next period, 0 = 0, he receives
V0(0; ) = 
 c(q) + V1  m; 0+ (1  )V0(0; 0): (64)
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However, if he chooses to be a seller next period, 0 = 1, he receives
V0(0; ) = 
 c(q) + V0  m; 0+ (1  )V0(0; 0): (65)
We focus on steady state Markov strategies, hence, 0 = 00 between any
two periods. Suppose every agent chooses 0 = 0, but one seller considers
a deviation ~0 2 (0; 1]. Consider rst ~0 = 1. This implies the agent is a
seller forever, bears the cost of production in any successful trade, and never
gets to consume. Clearly, this is a dominated strategy. Since we only have
one pure strategy equilibrium, 0 = 0, and any well dened games such as
this one have an odd number of equilibria, there cannot be a mixed strategy
equilibrium 0 2 (0; 1).
In the steady state  = 0, and the value functions are similar to the
ones derived in Section 3.1, but where buyers hold m units of money. That
is,
V0(0; ) =
 ( u(q)  (1  (1   )) c(q))
(1  )(1  (1     )) (66)
and
V1(m; ) =
 (u(q)  (1  (1  )) c(q))
(1  )(1  (1     )) : (67)
Denition 6 A symmetric steady state Markov equilibrium is a tuple
(q; d; V0; V1; h) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ~q = q and ~d = d = m is the symmetric Markov equilibrium which
solves the sellers problem (57) of the ex ante game characterized by
equation (60) taking V0(0; ) and V1(m; ), and h as given;
(ii) the value functions V0 and V1 satisfy (66) and (67), taking  as given;
(iii) the sellers exchange constraint evaluated at q and d is satised;
(iv) the strategies h solves (53), taking q; d; V0 and V1 as given.
4.3 Equilibrium
The existence and equilibrium properties are now stated and derived. As
in previous sections, the steady state equilibrium is referred to simply as an
equilibrium.
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Proposition 9 For any  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), in the steady state, there
exists a non-monetary Markov equilibrium and a unique monetary Markov
equilibrium with q 2 (0; q^) and d = m.
The proof of this proposition is essentially the same of Proposition 3
and is omitted. One interesting aspect of the monetary equilibrium is that,
given the number of money-holders, output is independent of the amount of
money they hold.
Corollary 3 In the monetary equilibrium, given a xed proportion of money
holders holding equal amounts, output is independent of the quantity of
money.
Proof. This can be observed by substituting the steady state values into
(60) giving the rst-order condition for q that is independent of m.
Therefore, when considering steady state equilibria, changing the amount
of money holding proportionately to m, for any  2 R+ would have no real
e¤ect, only a nominal one via an increase in equilibrium d; and hence, p.
Thus, in this model, money is neutral in this sense. Molico (2004) nds sim-
ilar results when analyzing proportional transfers in the Trejos and Wright
(1995) environment using numerical computation and a non-degenerate dis-
tribution of money, where all agents were allocate initially a positive amount.
It is easy to see that results similar to Lemma 1 and Proposition 4 also
hold. Here, output is decreasing in , the fraction of agents holding m units
of money as in Section 3.1 and increasing on . Moreover, as in Proposition
4, there exists a ratio  such that q() = q, giving e¢ ciency on the
intensive margin.
However, there is no reason why this ratio should coincide with  =
:533, the fraction of agents holding money which maximizes the amount of
trade, the extensive margin, that we found in previous sections. Therefore,
there is still potentially a trade o¤ between the intensive and the extensive
margin. For instance, one can compare the implications of di¤erent initial
allocations of money. Let (l;mh)0 and (h;ml)00 be two possible initial
allocations where l < h and ml < mh. In equilibrium we obtain ql > qh,
and hence, p0 = m
h
ql
and p00 = m
l
qh
. It might then be possible to choose the
allocations such that p0 = p00, but with ql > qh with the rst allocation.
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Therefore, if the goal is to achieve e¢ ciency at the intensive margin by
increasing output, it could be done without or minimal nominal e¤ects by
giving more money to less agents initially. However, this could potentially
mean moving away from the e¢ cient extensive margin. The existence of
this kind of trade o¤ can be shown to hinge on the shape of the utility and
cost function, i.e. tastes and technology, using di¤erent functional forms.
For example, u(q) = q, and c(q) = q2, with  = :533, yields  = 1:14 and
q() = q, where e¢ ciency is achieved on all margins. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
q
u(q), c(q), T(q)
Figure 4:  = :99;  = 1:14 ;utility is linear, costs are convex and the third
line is the operator T (Q):
Finally, we can discuss the potential implications of using a lump sum
transfer  to all agents. In this case the implications would depend on the
initial fraction of agents who did not hold money prior to the transfer. If
the fraction is small enough, the fraction of agents choosing to act as seller
would remain the same, with sellers o¤ering contracts in equilibrium with
d = m + . The lump sum transfer would not a¤ect the extensive margin,
and only have a nominal e¤ect since output is independent of m. On the
other hand, if the fraction of agents not holding money prior to the transfer is
large initially, the transfer may a¤ect the decision to act as buyers, a¤ecting
the monetary equilibrium.
Overall, then, the e¤ects of monetary policy depend crucially on how
any increments (or reductions) in the money supply are distributed. If
the proportion of money holders is kept constant, then this policy will be
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neutral. However, in general, monetary policy that changes the number of
money holders (and, hence, buyers) can have real a¤ects.
5 Conclusions
The monetary exchange framework developed by Kiyotaki andWright (1993),
Trejos and Wright (1995) and others is exible enough to be able to encom-
pass multilateral matching and directed search, but still maintain its central
message: the existence of money as a medium of exchange depends on key
parameters such as peoplesdiscount factors and the quantity of money it-
self. We have found, though, that by doing this we have changed some of
the key policy implications of these models. In particular, this framework
points to the inuence of money on the buyer-seller ratio and, thereby, the
matching rate. This introduces an extra channel for monetary policy that
allows for non-zero money balances to maximize expected surplus. With
divisible money, yet another consideration appears: the precise e¤ects of
increasing the money supply depend on who the money is distributed to.
This contrasts with results in other models with divisible money (Shi (1997)
and Lagos and Wright (2005)) but is similar to the results found in Molico
(2004). Interestingly, we also nd that the indivisible money assumption in
Trejos and Wrights (1995) model may not be as important as it rst ap-
peared since an equivalent distribution exists as a steady state equilibrium
with divisible money.
We also found the unexpected conclusion that auctions are incompatible
with expected surplus maximization, unless they allow for lotteries in the
event of bilateral matches. The equivalence between auctions and posted
prices, with large markets, that appears with xed production (for example,
in the labor market literature cited above) does not hold in this monetary
framework. This is due to the fact that quantity adjusts with price in
these monetary models, optimal quantities (along the intensive margin) are
unique, and auctions induce price dispersion in equilibrium. In most directed
search labor market models, the quantity is xed, so the intensive margin is
not a concern.
Modelling divisible money with multilateral matching and directed search
leads to a very tractable stationary distribution of money holdings allow-
ing for simple analytical solutions, without introducing the extra modelling
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structures used by Shi (1997) or Lagos and Wright (2005). In this paper,
we restricted attention to steady state equilibria, and found that increases
in the money supply would be neutral only under proportional transfers to
all agents. Thus, arguably, money is neutral in the long run if new money
holdings are distributed in this way. It remains to be seen, though, what
occurs in this model if new money holdings are, for example, randomly dis-
tributed across the entire population. We conjecture that this would lead
to real e¤ects along the transition path but only nominal e¤ects in the long
run.
6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2. The rst-order condition of the deviant seller
without considering the constraint from equation (27) is
~q[(q
0
e)  c(~q)] = ~c0(~q) (68)
where ~q is the derivative with respect to ~q and represents the impact of a
deviation on the probability of trade. This also embeds the buyers reaction
through their mixed strategies as summarized by ~. In order to obtain an
expression for this derivative, di¤erentiate the probabilities of trade for a
seller and a buyer:
~q =
~
~q
and
~ q =
~ 
~q:
where ~and ~  refer to the derivative with respect to ~, and ~q reects the
impact ~q on ~. These two derivatives allows a link between the impact of
a deviation on the buyersprobability of trade with the one for the deviant
seller as follows:
~q =
~
~ 
~ q: (69)
Now to obtain a meaningful expression for ~ q, di¤erentiate the constraint
in (27) to get
~ q =  
[u(q)  (q0e)]
[u(~q)  (q0e)]2
 u0(~q)
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and using the constraint itself it simplies to
~ q =  
~ 
[u(~q)  (q0e)]
u0(~q):
Notice that as one would expect ~ q < 0. Using this into (69) and into the
rst-order condition (68) yields
 
~
~ 
~ 
[(q0e)  c(~q)]u0(~q)
[u(~q)  (q0e)]
= ~c0(~q):
In a symmetric equilibrium, ~q = q = qe, which implies ~ = , ~ = , and
~ =  . Furthermore, in steady state qe = q0e and referring to qe as simply q
we nd
  
 
[(q)  c(q)]
[u(q)  (q)] =
c0(q)
u0(q)
:
It is easy to verify that      =
( 1)
(1   )  0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the Implicit Function Theorem write q(; ) =
q as the equilibrium. Let D0 = [ u(q) (1   (1   )) c(q)] > 0 and D1 =
[(1   (1  ))u(q)   c(q)] > 0, which respectively holds if V0 > 0 and
V1 > 0. Using the value of  from (31) we can rewrite (34) as
c0(q)
u0(q)
= g()
[D0]
[D1]
:
Take  as given and totally di¤erentiate this equation to get
c00u0   c0u00
u02

dq = g
[D0]
[D1]
d+ g()

D0D1  D0D1
(D1)2

d
+g()

D00D1  D0D01
(D1)2

dq:
Collecting terms
dq =

g
[D0]
[D1]
+ g()
h
D0D1 D0D1
(D1)2
i

c00u0 c0u00
u02
  g() hD00D1 D0D01
(D1)2
id:
From the denitions of we nd D0 =  (u(q)   c(q)) < 0 and D1 =
(u(q)   c(q)) > 0, and it is easy to show that g < 0. Therefore, the
numerator of the above equation is always negative. Next, the rst term in
the denominator is always positive since u00  0. It remains to show that
the term
h
D00D1 D0D01
(D1)2
i
< 0 for all q 2 (0; qmax). One can verify that this is
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the case for all  and  2 (0; ) if and only if u0c0 < ucwhich holds given the
properties of the functions u and c. Finally, notice that there is discontinuity
 = 0. Given the above demonstration, lim!0 q(; ) = qmax, but at  = 0,
no monetary equilibrium can exist and q(0) = 0.
To show the impact of  on q consider the following derivatives D0 =
 (u   c) > 0 and D1 = (u   c) > 0. Totally di¤erentiate the rst-order
condition to get
c00u0   c0u00
u02

dq = g()

D0D1  D0D1
(D1)2

d
= g()(u  c)( D1   D0)
(D1)2
d
where the sign of ( D1   D0) as the same sign as  = V1   V0 > 0.
Proposition 10 Assume c0(0) > 0,
(i) For any  (hence M), there exists a  > 0, such that for all  <  the
unique equilibrium is a non-monetary equilibrium;
(ii) For any  < 1, there exists a  such that for all  > , the unique
equilibrium is a non-monetary equilibrium;
(iii) For all other parameter values, there exists a non-monetary equilibrium
and a unique monetary equilibrium.
Proof. First the non-monetary equilibrium q = V0 = V1 = 0 is easily
established since it satises all the conditions from the denition of an equi-
librium. Write the following transformation function representing the rst
derivative of the sellers objective function evaluated at the steady state
symmetric equilibrium q :
T (q) = g()[(q)  c(q)]u0(q)  [u(q)  (q)]c0(q)
where(q) is the steady state value from equation (31) and g() =

1 
 + 1

.
It implies that T (q) = 0 represent the rst-order condition, and in steady
state the equation (28). To show existence, observe that T (0) = 0, and
T (q), is continuous since u() and c() are continuous, and recall that only
q 2 [0; qmax], are equilibrium steady state candidates. Now consider
T 0(0) = g()[0(0)  c0(0)]u0(0)  [u0(0)  0(0)]c0(0):
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and it can be sown that [0(0)   c0(0)] > 0 if and only if V 00(0) > 0 and
[u0(0)   0(0)] > 0 if and only V 01(0) > 0, which they are. It follows that
T 0(0) = 0 if and only if
 =
(g() + 1)c0(0)u0(0)
0(0)j[g()u0(0) + c0(0)] > 0 for all 
or
g()[0(0)j   c0(0)]u0(0) = [u0(0)  0(0)j]c0(0) for all  < 1:
Noting that g0() < 0, with @T
0(0)
@ > 0 and
@T 0(0)
@ < 0, for all  <  or
 > , T 0(0) < 0 and there cannot be a value of q > 0 satisfying the rst-
order condition. Only non-monetary equilibrium exist. Otherwise, we have
T 0(0) > 0 and the rest of the proof proceed as in Proposition 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume 0 > 0, then possible outcomes within a
match implies c(q) = u(q) > 0, and hence, q > 0. Under the assumptions
about u() and c(), u 1(c(q)) = q is a strictly convex (one to one) equilib-
rium relationship, and note that u(q) > c(q) = u(q) for q 2 (0; q^). If 0 = 0,
clearly q = q = 0. Since c(q) = 0 implies q is increasing in 0, there exist
a ^0 such that q = q^.
Proof of Lemma 3. First we must show that q is decreasing in . Using
the denition of T (q) from the proof of Proposition 5
T (q) = 
 pu(q) + mc(u
 1(c(q)))
1  (1   p   m)
  c(q)
and the fact that we have uniqueness, it must be that T 0(q) < 0 at the
equilibrium q > 0. Totally di¤erentiating T (q) with respect to q and , we
need to show that
dq
d
=   T
T 0(q)
< 0:
Therefore, we are left to demonstrate that T < 0. Taking the derivative
and using q = u 1(c(q)) into the equilibrium values (43) and (44) we nd
T =

1  (1   p   m)
 m
(1  )V1(q)
 m
  p
(1  )V0(q)
p
< 0
since  m < 0 and in equilibrium it must be that V1(q) > 0 and V0(q) > 0.
Next we must show q is increasing in . Totally di¤erentiating T (q)
again with respect to q and , we need to show that
dq
d
=   T
T 0(q)
> 0;
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which holds since T = (1  ) pu(q)+mc(u
 1(c(q)))
(1 (1  p m))2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Set up the Lagrangian
L = max
q;
fu(q) + V1   + 0(  c(q)) + 1(1  )g
with rst-order conditions
u0(q) = 0c0(q)
(0   1) = 1
and complementary slackness conditions
0(  c(q)) = 0
1(   1) = 0
Possibilities:
(1) 0 > 0; 1 > 0
 = c(q)
 = 1
This is the case of the standard auction in the paper. Note that u0(q) =
0c
0(q), but 0 > 0 can be bigger or smaller than 1, so consistent with our
ndings.
(2) 0 = 0; 1 > 0 or 0 = 1 = 0
u0(q) = 0 and  = 0
cannot be an equilibrium.
(3) 0 > 0; 1 = 0. From (0   1) = 1 = 0 or 0 = 1.
u0(q) = c0(q)) q = q
 =
c(q)

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This joined with the n > 1 case, we have u(q) =  and equilibrium
 = c(q
)
u(q) once we nd equilibrium q. Using the value for  we have
u(q) = 
 u(q) + c(q)
1  (1  c(q)u(q)    )
Formulate
F (q) =  (u(q)  c(q))  (u(q)  c(q))  (1  )u(q)
in equilibrium F (q) = 0. First note that F (0) =  (u(q)   c(q)) > 0
and F 0(q) = c0(q))   (1   (1   ))u0(q) R 0. Since  < (1   (1   ))
for all  < 1, when q < q, u0(q) > c0(q)) and F 0(q) < 0. However, for
q > q, u0(q) > c0(q)), then F 0(q) > 0. In fact F (q) reaches a minimum and
F (q^) > 0. Therefore, there exist two values of q such that F (q) = 0. Hence,
multiple equilibria.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium q0 < q when  2 (0; 1) is strictly decreasing in
 and increasing in .
Proof of the Lemma. Setting F (q0) = 0 and totally di¤erentiating with
respect to q0 and  yields
dq0
d
=
 
 (u(q
)  c(q))  (u(q0)  c(q0))

 F 0(q0) < 0
since   < 0,  > 0 and F
0(q0) < 0 for q < q. Similarly, but with respect
to q0 and  yields
dq0
d
=
 (u(q)  c(q)) + c(q)) + (1  )u(q)
 F 0(q) > 0:
Lemma 5 The equilibrium q1 < q when  2 (0; 1) is strictly increasing in
 and in .
Proof of the Lemma. Similar to the proof of the previous lemma but
noticing that F 0(q1) > 0 for q1 > q.
The rest of the proof follows from these Lemmas and Lemma 1 in the
paper.
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Proof of Proposition 8.
Consider the Lagrangian for the deviant sellers problem in (57)
L = max
f~q2[eqmin;eqmax]; ~dg ~V0 (m0; ~; )+0
0@e   [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i 
1A+1(m1  ~d)
(70)
with the associated rst-order conditions with respect to:
(eq) : @ ~V0 (m0; ~; )
@eq +0
0B@e eq + [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i2 u
0(eq)
1CA = 0
( ~d) :
@ ~V0 (m0; ~; )
@ ~d
+0
0B@e ~d   [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i2 
@V (m1   d; 0e)
@ ~d
1CA = 1
(0) : e   [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i = 0
(1) : m1   ~d = 0:
It should be clear that 0 > 0 since the associated constraint is always
binding for any deviations. Otherwise, buyers would not be using mixed
strategies. From Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the rst two conditions become:
@ ~V0 (m0; ~; )
@eq = ~q[(m0;m0 + ~d; 0e)  c(~q)]  ~c0(~q) = 0 (71)
@ ~V0 (m0; ~; )
@ ~d
= 1
where it is easily shown that @
~V0(m0;~;)
@ ~d
> 0, hence, 1 > 0, and we have
~d = m1.
The remainder of the proof follows the one for Proposition 2 where we
exploit link between the probabilities of trade given by (69) but now
e eq =   [u(q)  (m1;m1   d; 0e)]h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i2 u
0(eq)
which simplies to
~ eq =   ~ h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)iu0(~q):
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Using this into (69) and into the rst-order condition (71) yields
 
~
~ 
~ 
[(m0;m0 + ~d; 
0
e)  c(~q)]u0(~q)h
u(eq)  (m1;m1   ~d; 0e)i = ~c0(~q):
In a symmetric equilibrium, ~q = q = qe, which implies ~ = , ~ = , and
~ =  . It is easy to verify that      =
( 1)
(1   )  0.
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